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In this paper, we see that a worker in high-tech industry gets 
relatively less returns to tenure than those in low-tech industry. 
Using an earnings equation and classifying industries by their 
R&D intensity, I calculate returns to tenure and compare them by 
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impact of interaction between tenure accumulation and the speed 
of technological advances on wages. On the other hand, with 
IV-GLS, most coefficients of the tenure related variables are not 
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1 Introduction
Technological innovation has made our life more convenient and
many people, in general, have highlighted its positive roles on soci-
ety. However, we cannot ignore negative aspects lying behind of the
development of technology such as income gap among skilled and un-
skilled workers, inequality issues across countries, climate changes and
etc. Even though this dark side of the technological innovation has
grown to a considerable extent, a social atmosphere that promotes
the technological development is hard to be faded out. Therefore,
more rigorous and various researches that measure a true impact of
technological advances on society should be followed so that we have
an insight with which we can sharply compare the pros and cons.
In this paper, we will see that high technological innovation can
give negative impacts on worker’s returns to tenure. To be specific,
a worker in high-tech industry gets relatively less returns to tenure
than those in low-tech industry. We should disentangle the fact that
normally workers in high technology industry have comparably better
income than those in low technology industry. My approach is to look
at that the value of experience for a worker can be diminished quickly
when he works in highly innovative industry. This is largely because
the experiences that a worker has accumulated become depreciated
quickly when he/she workers in highly innovative industry. Since new
technologies in the industry tend to be introduced or updated in a
relatively short period, the value of experiences that a worker has had
becomes devalued. I believe this result leads to a negative impact on
the worker’s wage.
To investigate the relationship between returns to tenure and the
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speed of technological advances, this paper uses an approach for con-
structing tenure variables proposed by Kambourov and Manovskii
(2009) and Brown and Light (1992). They start to construct the em-
ployer tenure from identifying tenure switch whenever the reported
length of present employment is smaller than the time elapsed since
the last interview date. Then, they expand to accumulate occupa-
tion and industry tenures using the similar way. After identifying the
tenure variable and running an earnings equation, I calculate the re-
turns to tenure and compare them by low and high technology worker
group. For this analysis, I add an interaction term to the earnings
equation between the tenure variables and a dummy variable which
refers to the speed of technology in industry.
This paper is laid out as follows: Section 1 is an introduction,
Section 2 reviews the literature related to my paper. In the Section 3
shows the research methodologies that I take. Next, Section 4 dis-
cusses the main results and, finally, Section 5 makes a conclusion.
2 Literature Review
There is little literature which articulates the relationship between
a worker’s returns to tenure and the speed of technological innovation.
It is easy to encounter several papers focusing on either the source of
experience profile of wages or the impact of technological advances on
wages. However, they are not ones combining the two together. Now,
we look at the several related researches which have been developed
in the labor economics context.
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2.1 Tenure and Wages
Many human capital related literature has focused on finding the
source of experience profile of wages. To be specific, it has been still
a subject of debate which component is more important for wage
determination among distinct tenure characteristics. For example,
many researches claim that wages rise with firm (or employer) tenure.
Topel (1990) suggests a strong connection between job seniority and
wages in the typical employment relationship. Dustmann and Meghir
(2005) stresses the effect of firm tenure on wages using a unique ad-
ministrative data-set for Germany. It proposes that the rise of experi-
ence premium might represent firm-specific tenure rather than general
experience. However, Abraham and Farber (1987) and Altonji and
Shakotko (1987), earlier points out that the measured positive cross-
sectional return to tenure is largely a statistical artifact due to the
correlation of tenure with omitted variables representing the quality
of the worker, job, or worker-employer match. After controlling for
the omitted factors, they find that earnings do not rise much with
tenure.
There have been a number of papers which emphasize on industry
or occupational specificity of human capital. Neal (1995) argues that
workers receive compensation for some skills that are neither com-
pletely general nor firm-specific but rather specific to their industry or
line of work. The author uses displaced workers who find new jobs in
their predisplacement industry, and concludes that post-displacement
returns to pre-displacement job tenure resemble cross-section esti-
mates of the returns to current seniority. Also, Parent (2000) finds
that firm (employer) tenure has insignificant impact on wages once
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industry-specific capital is controlled and finds out what matters most
for the wage profile in terms of human capital is industry-specificity.
Kambourov and Manovskii (2009), on the other hand, maintains that
returns to occupational tenure are more crucial than any other type of
tenures. The paper uses the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID)
data, compliments the measurement errors of original occupation and
industry code by using the Retrospective Occupation-Industry Sup-
plemental Data Files and concludes that human capital is occupa-
tion specificity. Gathmann and Schönberg (2010), also, shows that
task-specific (occupational) human capital is an important source of
individual wage growth.
2.2 Technological Innovation and Wages
Over the past years, a number of studies have documented the
growing wage inequality and pointed to technological change for the
rise, which is called skill-biased technical change (SBTC). Levy and
Murnane (1992) claims that the wage inequality since the late 1970s
is mainly originate from technological changes which occurred over
the same period have resulted in a downward shift in the demand for
low-skill workers and in comparably a upward shift in the demand
for high-skill workers. Acemoglu (2000) argues that technical change
has been skill-baised and increase in inequality is most likely due
to acceleration in skill bias. The author says that the twentieth-
century has been characterized by SBTC because the increased supply
of unskilled workers in English cities made the introduction of these
technologies portable.
However, there is some counterpart argument against SBTC. Card
6
and DiNardo (2002) indicate problems and issues of that the SBTC
that wage inequality stabilized in the 1990s despite continuing ad-
vances in computer technology. Also the author says that SBTC fails
to explain the evolution of other dimensions of wage inequality, in-
cluding the gender and racial wage gaps and the age gradient in the
returns to education.
In sum, we have been able to find fruitful researches about the im-
pact of tenures and technological development on wages respectively.
However, there have been rarely the case for combining two factors
together for explaining wage differentials which I try to analyze.
3 Research Method
3.1 Data
I use the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) panel data of
years between 1976 and 1992. Specifically, I restricted sample of white
male heads of household, aged 18 to 64, living in the continental US,
and working in a manufacturing sector. Also, all observations that
worked for the government or received real hourly wages of less than
$1 in constant 1979 dollars are eliminated. Those who work less than
500 hours are excluded from the sample in that year. Self-employed
or being simultaneously employed by someone else as well as workers
in the military and farmer after 1975 are eliminated from the sample
together. Earnings functions are estimated on the sample spanning
the years 1981-1992.
In order to obtain returns to tenure, the first step is to construct
employer tenures from the data. I follow the way Brown and Light
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(1992) and Kambourov and Manovskii (2009) use. The basic idea
of accumulating employer tenures starts from identifying whether a
worker switches his job from the previous one. This employer switch
is identified using Partition T that Brown and Light (1992) find ac-
ceptable. The Partition T identifies, roughly, an employer switch
whenever the reported length of present employment is smaller than
the time elapsed since the last interview date. Once employer switches
are identified, employer tenure is increased by one year if an individual
does not report an employer switch.
We also accumulate industry and occupation tenures by identi-
fying their switches. The PSID provides 3-digits of occupation and
industry codes for each individual. Since it is told that there is a sig-
nificant number of measurement errors in the codes, Kambourov and
Manovskii (2009) uses the Retrospective Occupation-Industry Sup-
plemental Data Files to complement the errors. It claims that there
is a significant degree of disagreement between the originally assigned
PSID occupation and industry codes and the codes assigned to the
same individuals in the Retrospective Files as well as there is a higher
degree of misclassification of occupations and industries in the origi-
nally coded data. In my paper, I also use the Retrospective Files for
identifying occupations and industries switches. The way to identify
occupation and industry switches is similar with the one for employer
tenure using Partition T as described above. I describe the informa-
tion for constructing tenures in detail in Appendix 6.1. Table 1 shows
the descriptive statistics of the sample used in the estimation.
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3.2 Classification of Industry by R&D Intensity
A variable which helps classify industries and reflects technologi-
cal innovation is required to analyze the main goal of this paper. I
adopt the classification of manufacturing industries which is proposed
by Hatzichronoglou (1997). In this classification, the concept of tech-
nology intensity has been expanded to take into account both the level
of technology specific to the sector (measured by the ratio of R&D ex-
penditure to value added) and the technology embodied in purchases
of intermediate and capital goods. Hatzichronoglou (1997) divided
manufacturing industries into four groups on the basis of the degree
of technology intensity: High, Medium-High, Medium-Low and Low
technology industries.
In the High-tech industry, for example, there are aircraft, phar-
maceuticals, computing machinery and Electronics industries. On
the other hand, industries related to paper printing, textile, clothing,
wood, pulp or food products belong to the Low-tech industry. Table 3
displays the list of industries classified by this method. Each observa-
tion in the sample is grouped by this classification using the 3-digits
industry code that PSID offers1.
Table 2 shows the number of observations for each group in the
sample. Due to the lack of observations in the high-tech group, I first
run the regression with the technology (dummy) variable which is
coded as 0 for Low and Medium-Low tech and as 1 for Medium-High
and High technology. Then, I continue to run the regression with the
whole four groups.




The following earnings equation is used for looking at the negative
impact of technological innovation on wages.
logwijmnt =β1Emp.Tnrijt + β2Ind.Tnrint + β3Occ.Tnrimt + β4Ageit+
β5tech+ β6tech · Emp.Tnrijt + β7Eduit +Dummies+ θit
(1)
where wijmnt is real hourly wage of person i working in period t
with employer j in occupation m and industry n. Emp.Tnr, Occ.Tnr,
and Ind.Tnr denote tenure with current employer, occupation and
industry, respectively. Those variables have square terms in the equa-
tion. Ageit and Eduit refer to the age and the level of education
of person i in period t. Tech is a dummy variable which indicates
whether a worker’s industry is in low or high technology and there
are other dummies not specified above such as a martial status, year
and region dummies.
Also, there is an interaction term tech·Emp.Tnrijt. To support my
argument about a negative correlation between tenures and whether
an industry is highly innovative or not, I want to point out that the
interaction term tech · Emp.Tnrijt has a crucial role in this paper.
To be specific, if the coefficient of the interaction term is negative,
we can infer that highly innovative industry negatively interacts with
tenures, and as a result, it gives negative impact on wages. I will
run two additional models by changing the tenure variable in this
interaction term to Occ.Tnrimt and Ind.Tnrint and they allow us to
have a closer look at the relationship between technology and tenure
variables.
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I consider that there are unobserved individual-specific charac-
teristics and match components as well as observed variables which
I described above. For example, individuals with the same level of
firm experience would receive different wages due to matching qual-
ity. Therefore,
θit = µij + λim + νin + εit (2)
where µij is a job-match component, λim - an occupation-match com-
ponent, νin - an industry-match component, and εit is the error term.
We start by estimating the econometric model (1) with the pooled
OLS. However, unobservable match-specific components tend to be
correlated with tenure variables and, as a consequence, with the de-
pendent variable. A worker having a better occupation match is likely
to have higher occupation tenure and receive higher wages. This cor-
relation will bias the estimates in the pooled OLS. To minimize this
endogeneity issues, I employ the instrumental variable similar to that
proposed by Altonji and Shakotko (1987) and used by Parent (2000).
Specifically, if Xint is the industry tenure of individual i who is in
industry n in period t, X̄in is the average industry tenure of individ-
ual i, then the instrumental variable is X̃int = Xint − X̄in. We also
apply this instrumental variables to employer and occupation tenure
variables as well as their squared terms. Then, I estimate the instru-
mented model with IV-GLS method.
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3.4 Returns to Tenure
Now, we see how to get the returns to tenure from the earnings
equation. Following the earnings equation 1, we simplify the variables
in the equation as follows.
logwijmnt =β0Emp.Tnrijt + β1Emp.Tnr
2
ijt + β5tech+
β6tech · Emp.Tnr +OtherV ars
We substitute the variable Emp.Tnr with x so that the wage equation
can be a function of employer tenure. Then, the difference between
the wage function at Emp.tnr = x and at Emp.tnr = 0 can be derived
as follows:
logw(Emp.Tnr = x) = β0x+ β1x
2+ β5tech+ β6tech · x+OtherV ars
logw(Emp.Tnr = 0) = β5tech +OtherV ars
logw(x) − logw(0) = β0x+ β1x2+ β6tech · x
After transforming the log wage form into the general form, we can
obtain the returns to tenure by calculating the ratio of wage when






Returns to Tenure ≡ w(x) − w(0)
w(0)
= eβ0x+β1x
2+β6tech·x − 1 (3)
Consequently, the equation 3 denotes to the returns to tenure.
12
4 Main Results
Now we discuss the results that I have obtained through pooled
OLS and IV-GLS estimation using the above earnings equation 1. Due
to the lack of the number of observations in high-tech group, first, we
narrow down the classification of industry into two groups, Low and
High, then we compare the returns to tenure for each group. After
discussing the case, we expand it to the four-groups case.
4.1 Case 1 - Low and High
In this subsection, we consider the variable TechDummy as a
dummy which is coded 0 if an observation’s current industry is either
Low or Medium-Low, and 1 otherwise.
4.1.1 Estimation Results
Table 4 and Table 5 show the results of pooled OLS estimation
and IV-GLS respectively. The column ”Model 1” of each table rep-
resents the results when the interaction term of employer tenure and
technology dummy is added. Similarly, the column ”Model 2” and
”Model 3” refer to the cases where the interaction term of technol-
ogy dummy is combined with industry tenure or occupation tenure
respectively. Lastly, ”Model 4” is the result when all the interaction
terms described above are added.
All the model have highly positive and significant coefficient for
TechDummy for both pooled OLS and IV-GLS estimations, which
means that workers in high-tech industry have relatively higher wage
than those in low-tech. Specifically, the impact of technology on wages
is to some extent different among models, but there are approximately
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15 to 20 percent wage differentials among workers in low-tech industry
and those in high-tech when we run the pooled OLS estimation, and
8 to 12 percent for IV-GLS given that the worker has no accumulated
tenure.
Compared to pooled OLS, the coefficients of tenure related vari-
ables in IV-GLS are less significant but both estimations agree with
most signs of the coefficients. The coefficients of Emp.Tnr and Ind.Tnr
of both estimations are positive and their square terms are negative,
while only the square term of Emp.Tnr in pooled OLS is strongly
significant. When it comes to Occupation tenure, both Occ.Tnr and
its square term are positive and not significant in pooled OLS. On the
other hand, the Occ.Tnr and its square term have different signs in
IV-GLS.
The impact of interaction term for tenure variables and technology
dummy on wage tends to be negative in pooled OLS but not to be de-
terministic in IV-GLS and need further discussion. When we look at
the Table 4, the interaction terms of column 1 to 3 have negative signs
and it is statistically significant for the interaction term of occupation
tenure and technology dummy. In the case of ”Model 4”, the coeffi-
cients of the interaction terms are not significant but they appear to
be negative signs. This result coincides with my initial guess that high
tech industry is negatively interacted with tenures. If we move on to
the IV-GLS, however, it is hard to see the desired result. Looking at
the Table 5, we can check that all the interaction terms in different
models are not statistically significant. Especially, in the case of the
interaction term for occupation tenure and technology dummy which
is highly significant in OLS, the coefficient closes to zero and has a
high variance.
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4.1.2 Returns to Tenure
Table 6 and Table 7 show the returns to tenure derived from the
equation 3.4 using the coefficients obtained from pooled OLS and IV-
GLS respectively. There are three different columns in each table:
Employer, Industry and Occupation. Each column links to the re-
turns to Employer, Industry and Occupation tenures, respectively. I
obtain the returns to tenure corresponding to the ”Model” 1-3 in the
estimation table. In the pooled OLS model, first, we are able to find
that there are strong inclination that workers in low tech industry have
higher returns to tenure than those in high tech industry. Specifically,
although returns to employer tenure in both low and high tech groups
and returns to occupation tenure in high tech group are not statisti-
cally significant, the tendency that returns to tenure in low tech are
strongly higher in industry tenure and slightly higher in employer and
occupation tenures than those in high tech.
If we move on to the returns to tenure with IV-GLS, however,
the tendency that low tech group has higher returns to tenure than
high tech group becomes vague and this requires us to have further
discussion. To be specific, Most returns to tenure obtained through
IV-GLS are not significant except the one in high-tech group in in-
dustry tenure. This comes mainly from the fact that the interaction
terms between technology and tenure variables in IV-GLS come out
insignificant but positive and results in higher returns to tenure with
statistically not significant in high-tech group compared with in low-
tech group. To rigorously analyze this effect, we need to look at the
case where the industry categorization is extended from two to four
groups.
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4.2 Case 2 - Low, Medium-Low, Medium-High and High
Now, we check the case where the variable Tech is coded 0, 1, 2
and 3 when an observation’s current industry is Low, Medium-Low,
Medium-High and High respectively. When I run the regression, I use
the variable as three dummy variables.
4.2.1 Estimation Results
Table 8 and Table 9 show the results of pooled OLS estimation and
IV-GLS respectively. As we check in the Table 4 and Table 5, when
technology is more subdivided, the impact of high technology on wages
is strongly and positively detected. The higher the technology is, the
higher returns to technology is observed both in OLS and IV-GLS.
Also, the signs and statistical significance of tenure related variables
in this analysis coincide with the case where technology is itemized
with Low and High cases.
When it comes to the interaction terms for tenure variables and
technology variable Tech, the similar results with the previous case are
obtained. To be specific, in pooled OLS, the coefficients of interaction
terms tend to have more negative effect on wages as the technology
goes to higher level. We can get this result from the ”Model” 1 to
3. However, in ”Model 4” where all the interaction terms are put to-
gether, the tendency is not detected but somewhat the opposite result
comes out in Employer and Industry tenures. In the case of the in-
teraction term with occupation tenure and technology, the correlation
between the interaction term and wage can be observed.
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4.2.2 Returns to Tenure
Let’s move on to the returns to tenure in the case of the four-
grouped industries. Table 10 and Table 11 display the returns to
tenure derived from pooled OLS and IV-GLS respectively. In the
tables, there are four columns and each column means the level of
technology. For example, the first column, Low, shows the returns to
tenure for Low-tech workers and I put the 2, 5 and 8 years of returns
to employer, industry and occupation tenures. In this Table 10, it is
prone to have smaller returns to tenure as technology is developed.
While returns to employer and occupation tenures are not statisti-
cally significant in the table, returns to industry tenure are strongly
significant.
On the other hand, Table 11 does not show an apparent decline as
technology goes to higher level, but excluding the Medium-High group
make the result close to my argument. Except returns to employer
and industry tenures in Medium-High, every return to tenure is not
statistically significant. This comes from the fact that the regression
coefficients of tenure variables and interaction terms in IV-GLS is not
significant. Therefore, the calculated returns to tenure has high vari-
ances. As technology goes to higher level, the corresponding returns
to tenure have less value when we somehow ignore the Medium-High
group. For example, when we look at the 5 year returns to employer
tenure, 0.0482 for Low, 0.0248 for Medium-Low, 0.0539 for Medium-
High and 0.0132 for High are calculated. The value for Medium-High
is considerably higher than any other group. I am sure that this group
has a crucial role in disturbing the result in IV-GLS in both Case 1
and Case 2, and we need further discussion for solving this issue.
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5 Conclusion
In Labor Economics, both the impact of technology on wage and
finding the source of the experience profile of wages have been crucial
research topics. Although there are some academically conflict points
but solutions for the issues, such as skill-biased technical change and
occupational, firm or industry specificity to human capital, have been
developed well. However an approach that combines two issues to-
gether has been rarely investigated and my paper tries to analyze
them together which can give us an important economic implication.
My paper suggests the value of a worker’s experience in highly
innovative industry can be less than the one in comparably not speedy
innovative industry. I categorize manufacturing industries by R&D
intensity proposed by Hatzichronoglou (1997) and use the Panel Study
of Income Dyanmics (PSID) data to estimate an earnings equation
with pooled OLS and IV-GLS methods. After then, I calculate the
returns to tenure using the devised formula from earnings equation 1.
In the result of pooled OLS, we can check out the tendency that
high-tech industry workers have less returns to tenure than low-tech
industry workers, although the impact of technology on wage is higher
in high-tech than low-tech. However, with the IV-GLS which is used
for reducing endogeneity issues, the result is not deterministic. To
be specific, most coefficients for tenure related variables come out not
statistically significant. As a consequence, there comes no convincing
results for returns to tenure. When we divide the technology into
four groups, fortunately, it is possible to see that there is somewhat
strangely higher returns to tenure in Medium-High technology group
than any other group. We need further discussion related to this fact
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in order to have more reliable results..
Although this study has meaningful implications, it has some lim-
itations and requires further discussions. First of all, after reducing
the endogeneity issues, the coefficients of tenure related variables are
not statistically significant. We may consider it as a fact but we need
to look at the procedures that I have constructed tenure variables. In
the process of clearing data and making new tenure variables, there
have been chances to code the variables in a wrong way. Second, we
can take other method to measure the speed of technological inno-
vation. For example, total-factor productivity (TFP) can be another
method to measure the speed of technological advances for industry
instead of using the R&D intensity. Each sector has different growth
rate of TFP and we can categorize industries by looking at the growth
rate and dividing them. This can be alternative measure and plays
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6.1 Constructing Tenures Variables
6.1.1 Employer Tenure
We identify the employer switch from the responses to the follow-
ing questions in the PSID:
1976-1983: ”How long have you had your present position?”
1984-1992: ”In what month and year did you start working in your
present (position/work situation)?”
To identify employer switches from the PSID using the length of
employment series in 1976-1978 and 1981-1992, we use the Partition
T method, similar to the method that (Brown and Light, 1992) uses.
The details follow.
A employer switch is identified if:
1. In 1976 and the reported employer tenure is less than 15 months.
2. In any year after 1976 (inclusive) if the reported length of present
employment is smaller than the time elapsed since the last in-
terview.
3. In addition, in any year after 1977 (inclusive) if
• the reported length of present employment is smaller than
10 months and the time elapsed since the last interview is
not known.
• the reported length of present employment is between 10
and 15 months, the reported length of employment in the
previous year is higher than 5 months, and the time elapsed
since the last interview is not known.
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• the reported length of present employment is between 15
and 21 months, the reported length of employment in the
previous year is higher than 11 months, and the time elapsed
since the last interview is not known.
• the reported length of present employment is between 10
and 15 months and the person is a new entrant into the
sample as head of a household.
• the reported length of present employment is between 10
and 15 months, is longer than the time elapsed since the
last interview, and no employer switch could be identified
in the previous year due to missing data on employer tenure
in that year.
• the reported length of present employment is smaller than
18 months, is no longer than the time elapsed since the
last interview, and no employer switch was identified in
the previous year.
• the reported length of present employment is longer than
the time elapsed since the last interview date, an employer
switch was identified in the previous year, and the differ-
ence between reported employer tenure minus the time that
elapsed since the last interview and employer tenure re-
ported in the previous year is smaller or equal to -6.
We get information related to promotions in the PSID from the
responses to the following questions:
1976-1978: ”What happened to the job you had before-did the
company fold, were you laid off, or what?”
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1979-1983: ”What happened to the job you had before-did the
company go out of business, were you laid off, promoted, were you
not working, or what?”
1984-1987: ”What happened to that job-did the company go out
of business, were you (HEAD) laid off, promoted, or what?”
The answers for these question in the 1976-1987 period are:
1. Company folded/changed hands/moved out of town; employer
died/went out of business
2. Strike; lockout
3. Laid off; fired
4. Quit; resigned; retired; pregnant; needed more money; just
wanted a change in jobs; was self-employed before; still has previous
job (in addition to the job in C6)
5. No previous job; first full-time or permanent job ever had; was
not working before this
6. Promotion
7. Other-(including drafted into service or any mention of service)
8. Job was completed; seasonal work; was a temporary job
After 1987, there is no question related to promotions and promotion
is no longer among the separate possible answers.
Once employer switches are identified, we construct employer tenures
as follows. Every person who is present in the sample in 1976 or enters
the sample in a later year is assigned tenure equal to his/her employer
tenure in that year. Whenever an employer switch is identified in a
year, employer tenure is set equal to the reported tenure in that year.
Then in 1976-1992 employer tenure is increased by one year (twelve
months) if the individual does not report an employer switch and
works more than 800 hours during that year. If the individual does
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not report an employer switch but works at most 800 hours during
that year, his/her employer tenure is not incremented.
6.1.2 Industry and Occupation Tenures
An occupation (industry) switch is identified if an individual re-
ports an occupational (industry) different from his/her most recent
report of an occupation (industry). For example, an individual who
works for two consecutive years would be regarded as switching occu-
pations (industries) if he/she reports a current occupation (industry)
different from the one he/she reported in the previous year. If an
individual works in a year but was unemployed for the previous years,
occupation (industry) switch is detected if the current occupation (in-
dustry) is different from one reported the most recently.
As (Kambourov and Manovskii, 2009) suggests, I adopt the Retro-
spective Files so that occupation and industry switches of 1976-1980
are identified using the files. After 1980, I use the occupation and in-
dustry codes which are originally coded in the PSID. After identifying
the occupation and industry switches, we construct occupation and
industry tenure as follows. Every person who is present in the sample
in 1976 or enters the sample in a later year is assigned occupation and
industry tenure equal to his/her employer tenure in that year. Occu-
pation (industry) tenure is increased by one year if the individual does
not report an occupational (industry) switch next year, works more
than 800 hours during that year, and reports being employed. the
occupational (industry) tenure is not incremented if the individual is
unemployed or works at most 800 hours during that year. If an in-
dividual reports an occupation (industry) switch, his/her occupation
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(industry) tenure is reset to 6 months.
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Variable mean sd min max
Age 42.72 9.13 24.00 64.00
Years of Education 12.27 2.70 3.00 17.00
Employer Tenure 8.18 6.16 0.00 26.00
Occupation Tenure 9.27 6.29 0.08 26.00
Industry Tenure 10.15 6.17 0.08 29.00
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
2
Low Medium-Low Medium-High High Total
158 124 210 39 531
Table 2: Distribution of Sample for Technology Intensity (# of Indi-
viduals: 552)
2We have 3700 observations and 550 individuals in the period 1981-1992. Since
a number of individuals pause to work and become unemployed for a couple of




High Aircraft and spacecraft
High Pharmaceuticals
High Office, accounting and computing machinery
High Radio, TV and communciations equipment
High Medical, precision and optical instruments
Medium-High Electrical machinery and apparatus, n.e.c.
Medium-High Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers
Medium-High Chemicals excluding pharmaceuticals
Medium-High Railroad equipment and transport equipment, n.e.c.
Medium-High Machinery and equipment, n.e.c.
Medium-Low Building and repairing of ships and boats
Medium-Low Rubber and plastics products
Medium-Low Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel
Medium-Low Other non-metallic mineral products
Medium-Low Basic metals and fabricated metal products
Low Manufacturing, n.e.c.; Recycling
Low Wood, pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing
Low Food products, beverages and tobacco
Low Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear
Table 3: Classification of Manufacturing Industry by R&D Intensity
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Age 0.0042 0.0041 0.0044 0.0037
(0.0066) (0.0066) (0.0066) (0.0066)
Age2 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Emp.Tnr 0.0085 0.0077 0.0073 0.0037
(0.0054) (0.0053) (0.0053) (0.0056)
Emp.Tnr2 ∗ 100 −0.0913∗∗∗ −0.0910∗∗∗ −0.0889∗∗∗ −0.0875∗∗∗
(0.0260) (0.0260) (0.0260) (0.0260)
TechDummy 0.1459∗∗∗ 0.1556∗∗∗ 0.1865∗∗∗ 0.1772∗∗∗
(0.0202) (0.0233) (0.0216) (0.0243)
Ind.Tnr 0.0119∗ 0.0129∗∗ 0.0121∗∗ 0.0121∗
(0.0046) (0.0047) (0.0046) (0.0048)
Ind.Tnr2 ∗ 100 −0.0142 −0.0141 −0.0155 −0.0155
(0.0218) (0.0218) (0.0218) (0.0218)
Occ.Tnr 0.0021 0.0023 0.0052 0.0081
(0.0054) (0.0054) (0.0055) (0.0056)
Occ.Tnr2 ∗ 100 0.0399 0.0391 0.0390 0.0371
(0.0253) (0.0253) (0.0252) (0.0253)
Edu −0.0468∗∗∗ −0.0466∗∗ −0.0467∗∗∗ −0.0468∗∗∗
(0.0142) (0.0142) (0.0141) (0.0141)
Edu2 0.0057∗∗∗ 0.0057∗∗∗ 0.0057∗∗∗ 0.0057∗∗∗
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006)
Martial 0.0502∗ 0.0493∗ 0.0484∗ 0.0476∗
(0.0197) (0.0197) (0.0197) (0.0197)
Emp.Tnr · Tech −0.0013 0.0063∗
(0.0019) (0.0032)
Ind.Tnr · Tech −0.0020 0.0001
(0.0019) (0.0028)
Occ.Tnr · Tech −0.0055∗∗ −0.0102∗∗∗
(0.0019) (0.0029)
R2 0.4268 0.4269 0.4281 0.4288
Adj. R2 0.4236 0.4237 0.4248 0.4253
Num. obs. 3674 3674 3674 3674
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Table 4: Earnings Functions Estimates, Pooled OLS.
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Age 0.0122 0.0122 0.0123 0.0123
(0.0069) (0.0069) (0.0069) (0.0069)
Age2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Emp.Tnr 0.0095 0.0106 0.0103 0.0119
(0.0069) (0.0066) (0.0066) (0.0073)
Emp.Tnr2 ∗ 100 −0.0321 −0.0333 −0.0321 −0.0337
(0.0312) (0.0312) (0.0312) (0.0312)
TechDummy 0.1146∗∗∗ 0.0795∗ 0.1250∗∗∗ 0.0934∗
(0.0331) (0.0365) (0.0369) (0.0427)
Ind.Tnr 0.0088 0.0054 0.0087 0.0038
(0.0062) (0.0066) (0.0062) (0.0070)
Ind.Tnr2 ∗ 100 −0.0301 −0.0293 −0.0298 −0.0286
(0.0288) (0.0288) (0.0288) (0.0289)
Occ.Tnr −0.0074 −0.0077 −0.0076 −0.0068
(0.0065) (0.0065) (0.0069) (0.0070)
Occ.Tnr2 ∗ 100 0.0380 0.0395 0.0380 0.0401
(0.0301) (0.0301) (0.0301) (0.0301)
Edu −0.0403∗∗ −0.0402∗∗ −0.0404∗∗ −0.0402∗∗
(0.0143) (0.0143) (0.0143) (0.0143)
Edu2 0.0055∗∗∗ 0.0055∗∗∗ 0.0055∗∗∗ 0.0055∗∗∗
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006)
Martial 0.0546∗∗ 0.0547∗∗ 0.0548∗∗ 0.0552∗∗
(0.0200) (0.0200) (0.0200) (0.0200)
Emp.Tnr · Tech 0.0019 −0.0029
(0.0045) (0.0064)
Ind.Tnr · Tech 0.0057 0.0081
(0.0040) (0.0053)
Occ.Tnr · Tech 0.0004 −0.0019
(0.0043) (0.0052)
AIC 3294.0861 3292.4877 3294.3416 3313.0584
BIC 3473.9263 3472.3279 3474.1818 3505.2844
Log Likelihood -1618.0431 -1617.2439 -1618.1708 -1625.5292
Num. obs. 3674 3674 3674 3674
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Table 5: Earnings Functions Estimates, IV-GLS.
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Employer Industry Occupation
year Low High Low High Low High
2 Returns to Tenure 0.0134 0.0108 0.0257*** 0.0216** 0.012 9e-04
Std Deviation (0.01) (0.01) (0.0089) (0.0088) (0.0101) (0.0099)
5 Returns to Tenure 0.0199 0.0134 0.0631*** 0.0527*** 0.0363 0.0081
Std Deviation (0.0215) (0.0213) (0.0199) (0.0194) (0.0222) (0.0214)
8 Returns to Tenure 0.0096 -7e-04 0.0992*** 0.0819*** 0.0687** 0.0226
Std Deviation (0.0286) (0.0283) (0.028) (0.0271) (0.0308) (0.0292)
Table 6: Returns to Tenures with Two Industry Groups, Pooled OLS
model
Employer Industry Occupation
year Low High Low High Low High
2 Returns to Tenure 0.0179 0.0218 0.0096 0.0211* -0.0135 -0.0128
Std Deviation (0.0131) (0.0136) (0.0124) (0.012) (0.0126) (0.0124)
5 Returns to Tenure 0.0403 0.0504 0.0196 0.049* -0.0279 -0.0262
Std Deviation (0.0297) (0.0313) (0.0278) (0.0272) (0.0273) (0.0271)
8 Returns to Tenure 0.0571 0.0736 0.0244 0.0721* -0.0355 -0.0327
Std Deviation (0.0431) (0.0461) (0.0396) (0.0389) (0.0381) (0.0377)
Table 7: Returns to Tenures with Two Industry Groups, IV-GLS
model
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Age 0.0019 0.0018 0.0018 0.0010
(0.0066) (0.0066) (0.0065) (0.0065)
Age2 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Emp.Tnr 0.0081 0.0076 0.0062 −0.0022
(0.0054) (0.0053) (0.0053) (0.0059)
Emp.Tnr2 ∗ 100 −0.0893∗∗∗ −0.0901∗∗∗ −0.0827∗∗ −0.0858∗∗∗
(0.0257) (0.0258) (0.0257) (0.0257)
Tech(MLow) 0.1586∗∗∗ 0.1362∗∗∗ 0.2485∗∗∗ 0.1884∗∗∗
(0.0289) (0.0333) (0.0307) (0.0344)
Tech(MHigh) 0.2085∗∗∗ 0.2158∗∗∗ 0.2846∗∗∗ 0.2546∗∗∗
(0.0241) (0.0284) (0.0257) (0.0294)
Tech(High) 0.2413∗∗∗ 0.2476∗∗∗ 0.3192∗∗∗ 0.2860∗∗∗
(0.0433) (0.0488) (0.0451) (0.0503)
Ind.Tnr 0.0132∗∗ 0.0134∗∗ 0.0147∗∗ 0.0117∗
(0.0046) (0.0049) (0.0046) (0.0051)
Ind.Tnr2 ∗ 100 −0.0151 −0.0142 −0.0223 −0.0233
(0.0217) (0.0218) (0.0216) (0.0221)
Occ.Tnr 0.0032 0.0034 0.0093 0.0172∗∗
(0.0053) (0.0053) (0.0055) (0.0058)
Occ.Tnr2 ∗ 100 0.0307 0.0296 0.0354 0.0386
(0.0250) (0.0250) (0.0250) (0.0251)
Edu −0.0457∗∗ −0.0450∗∗ −0.0471∗∗∗ −0.0457∗∗
(0.0140) (0.0140) (0.0140) (0.0140)
Edu2 0.0057∗∗∗ 0.0057∗∗∗ 0.0058∗∗∗ 0.0057∗∗∗
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006)
Martial 0.0561∗∗ 0.0547∗∗ 0.0547∗∗ 0.0509∗∗
(0.0195) (0.0195) (0.0194) (0.0195)
Emp.Tnr · Tech(MLow) 0.0001 0.0112∗
(0.0028) (0.0047)
Emp.Tnr · Tech(MHigh) −0.0011 0.0120∗∗
(0.0023) (0.0038)
Emp.Tnr · Tech(High) −0.0015 0.0140
(0.0042) (0.0076)
Ind.Tnr · Tech(MLow) 0.0024 0.0107∗∗
(0.0028) (0.0041)
Ind.Tnr · Tech(MHigh) −0.0016 0.0022
(0.0023) (0.0033)
Ind.Tnr · Tech(High) −0.0018 0.0026
(0.0040) (0.0057)
Occ.Tnr · Tech(MLow) −0.0096∗∗∗ −0.0247∗∗∗
(0.0027) (0.0042)
Occ.Tnr · Tech(MHigh) −0.0092∗∗∗ −0.0194∗∗∗
(0.0023) (0.0035)
Occ.Tnr · Tech(High) −0.0100∗ −0.0222∗∗
(0.0041) (0.0068)
R2 0.4404 0.4408 0.4434 0.4476
Adj. R2 0.4366 0.4369 0.4395 0.4430
Num. obs. 3674 3674 3674 3674
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Table 8: Earnings Functions Estimates, Pooled OLS.32
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Age 0.0102 0.0104 0.0105 0.0101
(0.0068) (0.0068) (0.0068) (0.0068)
Age2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Emp.Tnr 0.0111 0.0107 0.0106 0.0151∗
(0.0071) (0.0066) (0.0066) (0.0077)
Emp.Tnr2 ∗ 100 −0.0332 −0.0345 −0.0343 −0.0338
(0.0309) (0.0309) (0.0309) (0.0310)
Tech(MLow) 0.1839∗∗∗ 0.1506∗∗ 0.1364∗ 0.1389∗
(0.0462) (0.0531) (0.0538) (0.0616)
Tech(MHigh) 0.1825∗∗∗ 0.1329∗∗ 0.1756∗∗∗ 0.1415∗∗
(0.0381) (0.0430) (0.0432) (0.0504)
Tech(High) 0.2586∗∗ 0.2178∗∗ 0.2477∗∗ 0.2479∗∗
(0.0796) (0.0787) (0.0770) (0.0943)
Ind.Tnr 0.0088 0.0050 0.0089 0.0026
(0.0061) (0.0070) (0.0061) (0.0076)
Ind.Tnr2 ∗ 100 −0.0286 −0.0273 −0.0294 −0.0289
(0.0286) (0.0286) (0.0286) (0.0287)
Occ.Tnr −0.0069 −0.0069 −0.0078 −0.0080
(0.0064) (0.0065) (0.0072) (0.0074)
Occ.Tnr2 ∗ 100 0.0365 0.0365 0.0370 0.0370
(0.0298) (0.0299) (0.0298) (0.0299)
Edu −0.0389∗∗ −0.0389∗∗ −0.0391∗∗ −0.0387∗∗
(0.0142) (0.0142) (0.0142) (0.0142)
Edu2 0.0055∗∗∗ 0.0055∗∗∗ 0.0055∗∗∗ 0.0055∗∗∗
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006)
Martial 0.0595∗∗ 0.0598∗∗ 0.0600∗∗ 0.0603∗∗
(0.0198) (0.0198) (0.0198) (0.0198)
Emp.Tnr · Tech(MLow) −0.0045 −0.0108
(0.0063) (0.0093)
Emp.Tnr · Tech(MHigh) 0.0011 −0.0060
(0.0052) (0.0072)
Emp.Tnr · Tech(High) −0.0068 −0.0085
(0.0108) (0.0153)
Ind.Tnr · Tech(MLow) 0.0003 0.0042
(0.0059) (0.0081)
Ind.Tnr · Tech(MHigh) 0.0067 0.0101
(0.0047) (0.0062)
Ind.Tnr · Tech(High) −0.0007 0.0051
(0.0087) (0.0117)
Occ.Tnr · Tech(MLow) 0.0021 0.0065
(0.0063) (0.0077)
Occ.Tnr · Tech(MHigh) 0.0018 0.0004
(0.0050) (0.0060)
Occ.Tnr · Tech(High) −0.0045 −0.0027
(0.0089) (0.0102)
AIC 3249.9584 3249.2131 3251.0724 3305.6791
BIC 3454.5679 3453.8226 3455.6819 3547.4260
Log Likelihood -1591.9792 -1591.6065 -1592.5362 -1613.8395
Num. obs. 3674 3674 3674 3674
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Table 9: Earnings Functions Estimates, IV-GLS.33
year Low Medium-Low Medium-High High
Employer 2 Returns to Tenure 0.0127 0.0129 0.0105 0.0096
Std Deviation (0.0101) (0.0105) (0.0099) (0.0121)
5 Returns to Tenure 0.0183 0.0187 0.0128 0.0105
Std Deviation (0.0219) (0.0231) (0.0213) (0.0276)
8 Returns to Tenure 0.0076 0.0083 -0.001 -0.0047
Std Deviation (0.0295) (0.0315) (0.0283) (0.0397)
Industry 2 Returns to Tenure 0.0267*** 0.0315*** 0.0234*** 0.0229**
Std Deviation (0.0093) (0.0094) (0.0087) (0.0117)
5 Returns to Tenure 0.0658*** 0.0784*** 0.0573*** 0.0561**
Std Deviation (0.0211) (0.0217) (0.0193) (0.0276)
8 Returns to Tenure 0.1035*** 0.1246*** 0.0895*** 0.0875**
Std Deviation (0.0303) (0.0316) (0.027) (0.0415)
Occupation 2 Returns to Tenure 0.0201** 8e-04 0.0015 0
Std Deviation (0.0102) (0.0104) (0.0098) (0.0122)
5 Returns to Tenure 0.0567** 0.0074 0.0091 0.0053
Std Deviation (0.023) (0.0229) (0.0212) (0.0278)
8 Returns to Tenure 0.1016*** 0.0205 0.0232 0.0171
Std Deviation (0.0328) (0.032) (0.029) (0.0408)
Table 10: Returns to Tenures with Four Industry Groups, Pooled OLS
model
year Low Medium-Low Medium-High High
Employer 2 Returns to Tenure 0.021 0.0119 0.0233* 0.0073
Std Deviation (0.0136) (0.0155) (0.0136) (0.0235)
5 Returns to Tenure 0.0482 0.0248 0.0539* 0.0132
Std Deviation (0.0315) (0.0363) (0.0315) (0.0574)
8 Returns to Tenure 0.0696 0.0317 0.079* 0.0132
Std Deviation (0.0466) (0.0544) (0.0467) (0.0894)
Industry 2 Returns to Tenure 0.009 0.0096 0.0226* 0.0076
Std Deviation (0.0133) (0.014) (0.0121) (0.019)
5 Returns to Tenure 0.0184 0.0199 0.0531* 0.0148
Std Deviation (0.0303) (0.0325) (0.0274) (0.0458)
8 Returns to Tenure 0.0228 0.0252 0.0792** 0.0171
Std Deviation (0.0441) (0.0483) (0.0396) (0.0705)
Occupation 2 Returns to Tenure -0.0139 -0.0098 -0.0104 -0.0227
Std Deviation (0.0132) (0.0149) (0.0126) (0.019)
5 Returns to Tenure -0.0291 -0.0189 -0.0204 -0.0505
Std Deviation (0.0291) (0.0339) (0.0276) (0.0439)
8 Returns to Tenure -0.0377 -0.0215 -0.0238 -0.0714
Std Deviation (0.0415) (0.0499) (0.0389) (0.0658)
Table 11: Returns to Tenures with Four Industry Groups, IV-GLS
model
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본 논문은 기술 발전 속도가 높은 산업에 속한 임금 노동자가 
낮은 산업의 노동자보다 숙련 경험에 대한 보상이 낮음을 보인
다. 임금 방정식과 기술 집적도에 따른 산업 분류를 바탕으로, 
숙련 경험에 대한 보상을 정의 및 계산하고 이를 산업 그룹별
로 분류한다. Pooled OLS 결과, 기술 발전 속도와 숙련 경험 
축적 사이에 음의 상관관계가 있음이 확인되지만, 도구 변수를 
활용한 IV-GLS의 결과 대부분의 숙련 경험 관련 변수가 통계
적으로 유의미하지 않게 나와 추가적인 논의가 필요하다. 많은 
관련 연구들은 기술 발전과 숙련 경험에 대한 연구를 독립적으
로 진행한다. 따라서 결과적인 제약에도 불구하고, 본 논문은 
기술 발전이 임금에 미치는 영향과 관련한 노동 경제학 문헌에 
기여할 수 있다고 본다.
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